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The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How
Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of
Consumer Law
Shauhin A. Talesh
This article demonstrates how the content and meaning of California’s con-
sumer protection laws were shaped by automobile manufacturers, the very
group these laws were designed to regulate. My analysis draws on and links
two literatures that examine the relationship between law and organizations
but often overlook one another: political science studies of how businesses
influence public legal institutions, and neo-institutional sociology studies of
how organizations shape law within their organizational field. By integrating
these literatures, I develop an ‘‘institutional-political’’ theory that demon-
strates how organizations’ construction of law and compliance within an or-
ganizational field shapes the meaning of law among legislators and judges.
This study examines case law and more than 35 years of California legislative
history concerning its consumer warranty laws. Using institutional and po-
litical analysis, I show how auto manufacturers, who were initially subject to
powerful consumer protection laws, weakened the impact of these laws by
creating dispute resolution venues. The legislature and courts subsequently
incorporated private dispute resolution venues into statutes and court deci-
sions and made consumer rights and remedies largely contingent on con-
sumers first using manufacturer-sponsored venues. Organizational venue
creation resulted in public legal rights being redefined and controlled by
private organizations.
This article demonstrates how the content and meaning of
California’s consumer protection laws were shaped by automobile
manufacturers, the very group these laws were designed to regulate.
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My analysis draws on and links two literatures that examine the
relationship between law and organizations but often overlook one
another: political science studies of how organizations influence
public legal institutions, and neo-institutional sociology studies of
how organizations shape law within their organizational field. The
political science literature on interest group politics suggests that
business interests often co-opt the legislative and regulatory pro-
cess through tactics such as lobbying, agenda setting, and venue
shopping (Kamieniecka 2006; Leech et al. 2002; Baumgartner &
Jones 1993; Ayres & Braithwaite 1991; Kingdon 1984; Quirk 1981;
Stigler 1971; Bernstein 1955). Political scientists, therefore, have
made great strides in explaining the mechanisms by which orga-
nizations actively influence law among public legal institutions
tasked with enacting, implementing, and enforcing legal rules.
Organizational sociologists applying neo-institutional analysis
focus more on the relationship of law and private organizations. A
central contribution has been to explain the impact of law on ‘‘or-
ganizational fields,’’ the community of organizations that coexist
and interact in some area of institutional life and share common
systems of meaning, values, and norms (Dobbin et al. 1993; Sutton
et al. 1994; Edelman 1990, 1992). More recently, neo-institutional
scholars of law and organizations turn the tables, by showing how,
at least in the civil rights context, courts defer to institutionalized
organizational structures and practices. Judicial deference to orga-
nizational practices renders law ‘‘endogenous,’’ i.e., the content
and meaning of law is determined by the social arena that it is
designed to regulate (Edelman et al. 1999; Edelman 2002, 2005,
2007; Edelman & Suchman 2007).
My analysis builds on both these literatures on law and orga-
nizations by examining how private entities influence the meaning
of legislation through both political and institutional mechanisms.
Specifically, the research question I examine is: How and under
what conditions can business organizations shape the meaning of
legislation, once it is enacted? I focus in particular on the capacity
of private business to influence how and where disputes over pub-
lic legal rights are resolved.
Amidst the proliferation of public-private partnerships and
‘‘responsive regulation’’ sanctioned and approved by legislatures
and administrative agencies, business organizations across a wide
variety of industries are increasingly engaged in ‘‘public’’ decision-
making in private settings (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Lobel 2004).
Private entities are actively governing themselves while simulta-
neously delivering services and benefits traditionally administered
by public entities (Macaulay 1986; Hacker 2002; Freeman 2000).
Private organizations’ expanding role even includes using internal
and alternative dispute resolution structures to adjudicate civil and
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consumer rights and remedies created by legislatures (Galanter &
Lande 1992; Edelman & Suchman 1999). In an era where Amer-
icans are increasingly likely to encounter law in private alternative
disputing forums sanctioned by the state, it is particularly impor-
tant to learn how business organizations can shape the meaning of
laws enacted by the legislature and determine where public legal
rights and remedies are resolved.
Existing political science and organizational sociology ap-
proaches have yet to adequately answer this question. Specifically,
neo-institutional sociologists generally fail to account for how or-
ganizations directly interact with the legislature and do not theorize
how organizational fields affect the meaning of law at the legislative
level. Political scientists focus less attention on law within organi-
zational fields and overlook institutional ideas about the impor-
tance of private institutional structures as a means of reshaping law
among core legal institutions.
This article develops an ‘‘institutional-political’’ theory that in-
tegrates political science studies of how businesses influence public
legal institutions with neo-institutional studies of how organiza-
tional responses to law are shaped by and through organizational
fields. I show how organizations’ capacity to shape the content and
meaning of law in the legislative context results both when orga-
nizations create and institutionalize dispute resolution venues
within their organizational field and when organizations directly
engage in political mobilization and lobbying tactics. As legal
and organizational fields and logics ‘‘overlap’’ (Edelman et al.
2001:1627–34), organizational ideas about the meaning of law and
compliance flow into the legislative and judicial arena and reshape
law’s meaning.1
By analyzing approximately 4,000 pages of legislative history, I
explore how automobile manufacturers shaped the meaning of
California’s consumer warranty laws over the past 35 years. Man-
ufacturers were initially subject to an aggressive but ambiguous
California consumer warranty protection law enacted in 1970, the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act or Act).2
The purpose of the Act was to hold manufacturers accountable for
warranties they issue to consumers. The legal rights and remedies
provided by the Song-Beverly Act and in particular, the Tanner
Consumer Protection Act3 (Lemon Law), a specific section of the
Act enacted in 1982 targeting automobile manufacturers, included
1 Edelman defines legal fields as ‘‘the environment within which legal institutions and
legal actors interact and in which conceptions of legality and compliance evolve’’ (Edelman
2007:58).
2 Civil Code § 1790 et seq. (1970).
3 Civil Code § 1793.22 (1982).
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a choice of full restitution or replacement, attorneys’ fees, civil
penalties, and a legal presumption as to what constitutes a ‘‘rea-
sonable number of attempts.’’
I show how automobile manufacturers created dispute resolu-
tion venues to resolve such conflicts and that these structures
became institutionalized within the organizational field. Manufac-
turer advocacy coalitions lobbied the legislature regarding the
‘‘legal value’’ (Edelman et al. 1999:447) of these structures and
linked the issue of consumer protection to existing business values
of efficiency, informal resolution of disputes, and customer satis-
faction. Without formally evaluating the merits of these institu-
tional venues, the legislature and courts subsequently incorporated
institutionalized organizational practices into statutes and legal de-
cisions. These actions made powerful consumer rights and rem-
edies contingent on first using manufacturer dispute resolution
procedures where equivalent rights and remedies are not available.
Moreover, consumers who ignore manufacturer institutional ven-
ues and go directly to court forfeit some of their rights. Thus,
automobile manufacturers actively created the terms of legal com-
pliance with consumer warranty protection laws and fundamen-
tally transformed public rights attainable in court into private
rights to dispute resolution. The legislative history provides a
pathway for tracing the process by which automobile manufactur-
ers’ response and construction of the meaning of consumer pro-
tection laws within their organizational field became enshrined in
public legal institutions at the core of the legal field. What was
supposed to be a powerful and consumer-friendly statute became
diluted and allowed ‘‘repeat players’’ (Galanter 1974:97) to gain
considerable advantage and ‘‘to hold court’’ (Edelman & Suchman
1999:943) in a privatized forum with less financial exposure.
My approach, therefore, expands prior analyses of the rela-
tionship between organizations and law in several ways. First, this
study brings neo-institutional sociology’s emphasis on the impor-
tance of private institutional structures into political science studies
of the legislative process and regulation. As this case study shows,
institutional venues for resolving disputes are, especially when de-
ferred to by legislatures and courts, a clear form of political power
worthy of closer focus by scholars interested in the relationship
between business, law, and politics. Changes to consumer protec-
tion laws were not merely the product of interest group lobbying
and capture of the legislative and regulatory process. By showing
how private institutional venues created and institutionalized
within the organizational field ultimately shaped the legislative
facet of the legal environment, I demonstrate that the politics of
consumer protection policy are, at least partially, institutionally
determined and rooted within the logic of organizational fields.
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Second, I simultaneously bring the legislature into studies of
legal endogeneity by neo-institutionalists. Whereas prior studies
focused on judicial deference to organizational dispute resolution
forums (Edelman et al. 1999; Edelman 2002, 2005, 2007), I focus
on legislative deference to organizational dispute resolution ven-
ues.4 In the legislative context, the endogenous construction of law
operates through constitutive processes such as cultural frames and
cognitive schemas but also involves direct political mobilization and
lobbying (compare Edelman & Stryker 2005). By importing polit-
ical analysis into neo-institutional studies of law and organizations,
I offer a framework for how neo-institutionalists can examine the
legislative (as opposed to judicial) facet of the legal field. Third,
although law and society scholarship over the past 40 years has
dedicated considerable attention to studying whether and
how rights matter in society (Scheingold 1974; Galanter 1974;
Tushnet 1984; Minow 1987; Crenshaw 1988; Rosenberg 1991;
Ewick & Silbey 1998; Albiston 1999, 2005), less attention is
currently devoted to consumer rights, an arena that affects all
individuals in society.5 I expand the reach of law and society and
neo-institutional analysis by refining and extending theories of
the endogeneity of law into the consumer protection law arena.
Finally, by linking political science and sociology literatures, I fol-
low a small cluster of scholars who are developing an integrated
field of scholarship concerning the relationship between organiza-
tions and law (Barnes & Burke 2006; Schneiberg & Bartley 2001;
Thelan 1999).
Organizational Responses to Law
Before examining how automobile manufacturers constructed
the meaning of consumer protection laws in California, I discuss
existing political science and organizational sociology literatures on
how organizations influence and shape law within legal and orga-
nizational fields.
4 Prior statutory analysis of Title VII by neo-institutionalists is traditionally limited to
analyzing the plain meaning of the statute upon creation, paying less attention to how
organizations influence the construction of statutes prior to and at inception.
5 Although law and society scholars in the 1960s and 1970s published a series of
articles on issues relating to the consumer-manufacturer relationship and the impact on
consumer rights in the context of federal and state consumer protection laws (Macaulay
1965, 1979, 1991; Andreason & Best 1977; Best & Brown 1977; Trubek et al. 1979; Trubek
& Bourgognie 1987), less attention has been recently channeled to examining consumer
rights.
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Business Influence Over Legislative and Regulatory Outcomes
For decades, political scientists have been probing the various
mechanisms by which businesses influence legislative outcomes and
the regulatory process. In particular, political scientists examine
how interest groups form advocacy coalitions that lobby, negotiate
for favorable laws, and build (or set) agendas in their favor
(Kamieniecka 2006; Leech et al. 2002; Baumgartner & Jones 1993;
Kingdon 1984). Two major tactics that businesses use to influence
legislators and public opinion are issue redefinition and framing
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993). Often, businesses postpone and even
defeat policy proposals by amplifying critical beliefs and values
(Kamieniecka 2006), redefining policy goals (Snow et al. 1986), and
dominating the rhetoric of the debate (Riker 1996).
When direct influence is less likely to be successful, interest
groups and policy entrepreneurs often shop for venues and try to
move decisionmaking authority into alternative and potentially
more favorable policy venues (Baumgartner & Jones 1993). The
initial thrust of venue shopping studies focused on how venue
shopping is strategic, planned, and deliberate (Baumgartner &
Jones 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). However, more re-
cently, Pralle (2003, 2006) offers a more complex model of venue
shopping in practice and focuses on: (1) the limited rationality of
political actors, and (2) the cultural or ideological constraints on
venue choice. Advocacy groups choose venues not only to advance
substantive policy goals but also to serve organizational needs or
reinforce organizational identities and reputation (Pralle 2003).
Organizational considerations may also prevent venue shopping
even when it may seem rational to do so: ‘‘[t]he range of options
canvassed by a strategic actor is likely to be circumscribed by a
culturally specific sense of appropriate action’’ (Pralle 2003:256;
citations omitted).
More recently, political scientists are analyzing how businesses
shape and change institutions over time without formal revision of
rules or attack on statutes (Hacker & Pierson 2002; Hacker 2002;
Pierson 2004). Instead of attacking laws directly, powerful interests
and political elites adapt existing institutions and policies to new
ends (conversion), create new institutions or policies without elim-
inating existing ones (layering), and alter the effect of existing in-
stitutions on social life because of changing circumstances (drift)
(Thelan 2004; Streeck & Thelan 2004; Hacker 2004; Schickler
2001). Thus, business influence occurs within existing policy
bounds as well as through large-scale legislative reform (Barnes
2007, 2008; Hacker 2004).
In addition to influencing legislative outcomes, business influ-
ence on regulatory policy has also received significant attention by
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economists and political scientists (Quirk 1981; Posner 1974;
Stigler 1971; Bernstein 1955). Consistent with mainstream plural-
ist political science and client politics (Wilson 1989), ‘‘capture’’ ar-
guments show how competing interest groups reshape regulatory
agencies so that they become a friendly protector of private inter-
ests by (1) exerting direct influence on regulatory bodies, (2) in-
serting people within agencies who have sympathetic views toward
business, and (3) isolating regulatory agencies and making their
survival dependent on the existence of groups that need continued
oversight (Gormley 1983; Sabatier 1975; Kolko 1965; Bernstein
1955; Huntington 1952; Herring 1936; Shapiro 1988).
Political scientists have made great strides in explaining the
mechanisms by which businesses actively influence law among leg-
islatures and regulatory agencies. Political scientists, however, focus
less on how internal dispute resolution structures developed by
organizations can shape law among public legal institutions. To
tackle this issue and develop a theory that accounts for how or-
ganizations construct the meaning of law within an organizational
field and then import their logic into the legislature, the next sec-
tion draws on neo-institutional organizational sociologists who fo-
cus on how organizations shape their legal environment.
The Sociological New Institutionalist Movement and Legal and
Organizational Fields
Neo-institutional sociologists challenge the notion that organi-
zations simply resist, obey, or avoid law in a way that yields the most
rational or favorable cost-benefit outcome (Vaughn 1998; Pfeffer &
Salancik 1978; Williamson 1975; Scott & Davis 2007). Instead, neo-
institutionalists see organizations as complex social actors whose
behavior is shaped by their cultural environment (DiMaggio &
Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Scott 1983). These scholars are
interested in how common systems of meaning, values, and norms
develop among the community of organizations that make up the
organizational field (Suchman & Edelman 1996; Edelman 2007).
Thus, neo-institutionalists argue that rationality is socially con-
structed by nonmarket factors such as widely accepted norms and
patterns of behavior that become taken for granted and institu-
tionalized within organizational fields.
In response to antidiscrimination laws that alter the ‘‘legal en-
vironment,’’ organizations often adopt many legal practices and
structures because their cultural environment constructs adoption
as the legitimate or natural thing to do (DiMaggio & Powell 1983;
Edelman 1990, 1992). Organizations respond to new laws by cre-
ating new offices and developing written rules, procedures, and
policies that attempt to achieve legal legitimacy while simulta-
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neously limiting law’s impact on managerial power and unfettered
discretion over employment decisions (Edelman 1992). The in-
creasing legalization within organizations has been empirically
studied in response to changes in civil rights law (Dobbin et al.
1993; Dobbin & Sutton 1998; Sutton et al. 1994; Edelman 1990,
1992; Edelman et al. 1999), education (Short 2006), antipollution
law (Hawkins 1983), health and safety law (Bardach & Kagan
1982), and environmental law (Kagan et al. 2003). As organiza-
tional responses to law spread among the organizational field over
time, they become institutionalized (Edelman 1990).
Organizations’ ability to mediate law’s impact on organizations
can affect the manner in which claims are resolved.6 Edelman
et al.’s (1993) study of internal grievance complaint handlers for 10
large organizations revealed that complaint handlers were often
unconcerned with actual formal legal rights and outcomes, not
fully apprised of the law, and chose not to invoke legal principles
when attempting to address employee complaints.7 Neo-institu-
tionalists increasingly emphasize that organizational fields may
have multiple, contradictory logics that at times overlap with other
fields (Heimer 1999; Edelman et al. 2001; Schneiberg 2005). For
example, law becomes ‘‘managerialized’’ when the managerial and
business values of an organizational field influence the way we un-
derstand law, legality, and compliance (Edelman et al. 2001). That
is, lawlike structures developed among organizations try to adhere
to the primary logic within private organizational fieldsFnamely,
rationality and efficiency (Edelman 2007). However, these struc-
tures simultaneously try to appeal to the primary logic of the core
of the legal fieldFnamely, impartiality, justice, and protecting
rights (Edelman et al. 2001).
Law is rendered endogenous when managerialized concep-
tions of what law means are deferred to by core legal institutions
such as courts. That is, law is endogenous when ‘‘organizations are
both responding to and constructing the law that regulates them’’
(Edelman et al. 1999:407; Edelman 2002, 2005, 2007). Edelman
and her coauthors demonstrate that employment discrimination
law is endogenous to the extent that judicial interpretations of an-
tidiscrimination law come to incorporate the presence of institu-
tionalized structures as evidence of fair, nondiscriminatory
6 Antidiscrimination laws that are ambiguous with respect to the meaning of com-
pliance, constrain the procedures more than substantive outcomes of such procedures, and
contain weak enforcement mechanisms create more discretion and flexibility for employers
to respond (Edelman 1990, 1992; Edelman et al. 1993).
7 Other studies of alternative dispute resolution models used in the context of private
disputes also reveal that informality tends to disadvantage parties with fewer resources and
options (Abel 1982; Delgado et al. 1985; Delgado 1988; Erlanger et al. 1987; Silbey & Sarat
1989; Harrington 1985).
534 The Privatization of Public Legal Rights
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
treatment. As courts increasingly defer to internal grievance struc-
tures that place a premium on fair procedure without examining
their substantive effect, they weaken the capacity of equal oppor-
tunity laws to directly effectuate change (Edelman et al. 1999;
Edelman et al. 2001). Moreover, ambiguous and vaguely defined
legal terms such as discrimination become infused with managerial
values and principles that equate compliance mechanisms with per
se evidence of nondiscriminatory treatment. As courts embrace
managerial rhetoric and values into law, organizational construc-
tions of law gain not just organizational legitimacy, but legal legit-
imacy as well (Edelman et al. 2001). The blurring of overlapping
legal and organizational field logics, therefore, have powerful con-
sequences for how courts interpret law.
In sum, neo-institutionalists and political scientists tend to em-
phasize different mechanisms when explaining the relationship
between business organizations and law. Neo-institutionalists focus
on how organizations and organizational fields respond to law, of-
ten through symbolic indicators of compliance that diffuse among
organizations and become institutionalized. Only recently have
Edelman and colleagues begun examining how organizational
fields influence core legal institutions such as courts. Neo-institu-
tionalists, however, fail to account for how organizations directly
interact with the legislature and do not theorize how organizational
fields affect the meaning of law at the legislative level. An analysis of
legislative deference to organizational construction of law needs to
account for how organizations directly interact with public actors
such as legislators during the lawmaking process. By contrast, po-
litical scientists focus on the tactics businesses use to directly influ-
ence public legal institutions. Political scientists, however, focus less
attention on neo-institutional ideas about the importance of private
institutional structures as a means of reshaping the meaning of law
among core public legal institutions.
These limitations hinder the application of some political sci-
ence theories to situations where disputes are increasingly resolved
in private dispute resolution venues. For example, although it
is well settled that interest groups shop for favorable venues, less
is known about what interest groups do when shifting into ex-
isting venues is unlikely to lead to favorable outcomes. Although
regulatory capture takes various forms, typically capture studies
focus on business capture of existing governmental regulatory
agencies and regulatory enforcement. Capture studies also do not
address organizational reshaping of formal legislative content and
language once laws are enacted.
In this study, I develop an ‘‘institutional-political’’ theory to
show how organizations’ construction of law within an organiza-
tional field shapes the meaning of law among legislators and courts.
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I draw from neo-institutional ideas about the importance of insti-
tutional structures as mechanisms for endogenously shaping the
meaning of law and from political science literatures on how in-
terest groups form advocacy coalitions that lobby and reframe
issues at the legislative level in accordance with business prerog-
atives. The following case study explores how automobile manu-
facturers created and institutionalized private dispute resolution
venues in response to California consumer warranty laws, and then
convinced the legislature to incorporate these structures into stat-
utes. Legislative codification of manufacturers’ private structures
made consumer rights largely contingent on consumers using
these structures before seeking relief in court.
Examining the overlap among organizational and legal fields
allows me to demonstrate how ideas and norms about institutional
venues initially developed within an organizational field flow into
the core logic of the legal field. Although this study is consistent
with traditional political science studies of interest group politics,
venue shopping, institutional change, and capture, it enhances
these literatures by showing that political action and what busi-
nesses choose to lobby for is often determined and driven by in-
stitutionalized norms within the organizational field. By focusing
on the subtle process by which organizations’ construction of law
and compliance within an organizational field is successfully cod-
ified into law, this study presents a nuanced analysis about not only
how businesses shape the content and meaning of law, but also how
public rights created by statute become privatized and co-opted by
businesses. Organizations do not just capture existing institutions
or shift from one venue to anotherFthey create their own insti-
tutional venues.
Methodology
In order to examine how automobile manufacturers shaped
the meaning of law at the legislative level and determined where
public legal rights were adjudicated, I analyzed approximately
4,000 pages of legislative history concerning California’s two con-
sumer warranty protection laws: the Song-Beverly Act and the
Lemon Law. I obtained these documents from the California leg-
islative archives. Because the California legislature did not keep
transcripts of oral testimony at hearings during the time period I
reviewed, my inquiry consisted of written records. I took direct
advantage of situations in which organizations and legislators vol-
untarily produced information while a variety of statutory provi-
sions and amendments to the Song-Beverly Act and Lemon Law
were being created, drafted, and evaluated. This approach also
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allowed me to trace how manufacturers and legislators interacted
over time. To develop my initial sampling frame, I located (1) any
documents relating to the initial creation of the Song-Beverly Act in
1970, and (2) any documents relating to the enactment of the Cal-
ifornia Lemon Law in 1982 or subsequent amendments thereafter
until 2006. This search produced approximately 4,000 pages of
legislative history.
Next, I screened the documents for relevance. I defined as
relevant any documents concerning (1) consumer, manufacturer,
or legislative involvement in the creation of the Song-Beverly Act;
or (2) the creation of the Lemon Law in 1982 and/or amended
provisions relating to either the establishment of a legal presump-
tion or the creation of dispute resolution procedures. The Lemon
Law was specifically enacted to deal with warranty issues for new
motor vehicles. My purpose was to identify and closely examine the
complete history of the creation and codification of private dispute
resolution procedures into the Lemon Law.8 I was particularly in-
terested in examining this statute because it establishes a ‘‘legal
presumption’’ of what constitutes a ‘‘reasonable number of at-
tempts’’ for automobile manufacturers to fix warrantable defects.
Consumers are eager to invoke this statutory provision because it
establishes specific conditions under which consumers are entitled
to full restitution or replacement of their vehicles. I identified ap-
proximately 1,500 pages of relevant documents.
Once my initial screening of documents was complete, I em-
ployed ‘‘process tracing’’ (PT; George & Bennett 2005) methods
and carefully analyzed the legislative history. As a ‘‘within-case
method,’’ PT allows inferences about causal mechanisms within the
confines of a single or few cases (Bennett & Elman 2006). PT is also
useful for exploring the underappreciated temporal dynamics of
institutional change. When using PT, the researcher examines ar-
chival documents to determine whether a causal process suggested
by a theory is in fact evident in the sequence of events in that case
(George & Bennett 2005). This method allowed me to test whether
the California legislature’s deference to and codification of man-
ufacturers’ institutional venues could be explained by blending in-
sights of sociological neo-institutional theory and interest group
politics and lobbying. I traced the legislative history with an eye for
8 The analysis in the following sections is derived from my review of the legislative
history for the following statutes and amending bills: Cal. Stat. 1970, ch 1333, SB 272; Stat.
1971, ch. 1523, SB 742; Stat. 1972, ch. 1293, SB 685; Stat. 1976, ch. 416, SB 568; Stat.
1978, ch. 991, AB 3374; Stat. 1980, ch. 394, AB 2263; Stat. 1981, ch. 150, SB 282; Stat.
1982, ch. 381, AB 3561; Stat. 1982, ch. 388, AB 1787; Stat. 1986, ch. 547, AB 3835; Stat.
1986, ch. 547, AB 3835; Stat. 1987, ch. 1280, AB 2057; Stat. 1988, ch. 697, AB 4513; Stat.
1989, ch. 193, AB 1104; Stat. 1991, ch. 689, AB 211; Stat. 1992, ch. 1232, SB 1762; Stat.
2002, ch. 306, SB 1765. Additional information regarding the legislative history and spe-
cific documents in the legislative record is on file with the author.
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information that provided context, processes, or mechanisms that
contributed distinctive leverage in causal inference (Brady & Col-
lier 2004). By exploring the chain of events and the resulting de-
cisionmaking outcomes of the legislature, I was able to uncover the
sequence of events as bills and amendments were proposed and
make ‘‘causal process observations’’ (Brady & Collier 2004:252–5).
PT is considered most persuasive when the researcher is able to
trace an account from beginning to end, when there are few breaks
in the causal story, when multiple consistent within-path inferences
related to a centrally important theory are shown to be true, when
the quality of the evidence is high, and where some of the evidence
is of ‘‘smoking gun’’ quality, i.e., the evidence strongly corroborates
the explanation (Bennett & Elman 2006). As I demonstrate, all
these factors were present in my case study.
I relied on qualitative content analysis of each document and
traced the content and requirements of proposed laws against what
was ultimately enacted into law. I paid particular attention to the
written dialogue and struggle that took place among manufacturer
and consumer advocacy groups and the legislature. I explored
advocacy coalition formation and behavior and venue creation by
manufacturers over time. I also uncovered the manner in which
consumer warranty protection law became endogenous. Thus,
consistent with political scientists who study the subtle ways insti-
tutions develop and change over time (Hacker 2002, 2004; Barnes
2007, 2008; Pierson 2000a, 2000b, 2004), I used the legislative
history as a ‘‘testing ground for theory and not just the raw ma-
terial for compelling narrative’’ (Hacker 2002:65).
The legislative history contained a variety of documents that I
content-coded and categorized into three areas: letters, legislative
documents, and miscellaneous. There were a variety of letters in
the legislative history from many different groups, including but
not limited to manufacturers, legislators, governors, plaintiffs and
defense lawyers, consumers, consumer advocacy groups, manu-
facturer associations, and manufacturer advocacy groups. These
detailed letters provided a timeline and tremendous insight into
what each person or group’s position was concerning the relevant
bill or proposal before the legislature.9 The legislative documents
included committee reports, amendments, voting records for some
bills, legislative analyst reports, bill summaries, proposals, red-line
9 Many manufacturers also provided their own reports concerning their private in-
stitutional venues to assist the legislature. The legislative history included General Motors’
position statements; California Manufacturers’ issue statement, report, and editorial; Cal-
ifornia Automobile Dealers Association letters; New Motor Vehicle Board letters; Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association analysis; Ford Motor Company’s release statement in
opposition to the Lemon Law; problem papers; appeals board brochures; charts; and
proposed amendments.
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revisions of statutes, handwritten notes of legislators, and Judicial,
Senate, and Legislative Committee analysis. The miscellaneous
documents consisted of press releases, newspaper articles, inter-
views with legislators, reports from the federal government, and
other documents related to consumer warranty protection.
In addition, I used Westlaw to search for any published state
court decisions that interpreted the Lemon Law dispute resolution
procedure, Civil Code 1793.22(c).10 This search served two pur-
poses. First, it allowed me to evaluate what California courts said
regarding Lemon Law dispute resolution proceedings. Second, it
allowed me to determine whether California courts referenced the
third-party dispute resolution provisions in their opinions and, if
so, to determine whether courts afforded any deference to such
procedures. Four cases fit these criterions: Jernigan v. Ford Motor Co.
(1994), Suman v. BMW of North America (1994), Kwan v. Mercedes-
Benz of North America (1994), and Suman v. Sup. Ct (BMW of
North America) (1995). These cases revealed that courts also de-
ferred to the logic of manufacturers as to the value of institutional
venues.
An Institutional-Political Analysis of How Manufacturers
Construct the Meaning of California’s Consumer Warranty
Laws
This section demonstrates how automobile manufacturers
shaped the content and meaning of California consumer protec-
tion laws. Manufacturers created and institutionalized dispute res-
olution structures within their organizational field and then used
interest group tactics to lobby the legislature to codify such struc-
tures into law.
Stage 1: The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty ActFCreating a ‘‘Legal
Weapon’’ for Consumers
California’s consumer warranty statute was an outgrowth of
investigations and public hearings by the California Senate Busi-
ness and Professions Committee in November 1969. The commit-
tee concluded that aside from automobile repairs, the single largest
category of consumer complaints was warranty problems. In ad-
dition to warranties being confusing and misleading, consumers
complained that manufacturers and retailers rarely accepted re-
10 Under the California database, my search term on Westlaw was ‘‘Song/2 Beverly &
dispute/2 resolution & 1793.22.’’ This search produced 14 cases. Ten of the 14 cases were
excluded because these cases did not interpret the dispute resolution provision in any
manner and therefore did not fit the sampling frame criteria.
Talesh 539
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
sponsibility for making repairs under their warranties. The largest
number of warranty complaints concerned automobile dealers and
manufacturers.
The committee inquiry convinced California State Assembly
Senator Alfred Song that consumers ‘‘need legal protection’’ (Song
press release, 2 Feb. 1970). As the leading proponent and coauthor
of the Song-Beverly Act (Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq.), Senator Song
specifically indicated that the purpose of creating a consumer war-
ranty protection law was to establish ‘‘legal weapons’’ for consum-
ers (Song letter, 2 July 1971). If manufacturers wanted the
advertising and marketing benefits of issuing warranties at the
time of sale, manufacturers needed to eliminate the practice of
making warranties ‘‘little more than sales gimmicks’’ (Song letter,
10 Aug. 1970; San Francisco Chronicle, 25 June 1970, p. 12 [quoting
Song]).
The proposed Act set forth rights, responsibilities, and the legal
relationship of buyers and sellers of consumer goods in California.
Manufacturers or retailers issuing express warranties for consumer
goods sold in California that were unable to service or repair con-
sumer goods to conform to the applicable express warranties were
required to either replace the goods, reimburse buyers, or face
potential lawsuits. The Act initially proposed that if the buyer es-
tablished that a retailer or manufacturer’s failure to comply was
willful, any subsequent court judgment could include a civil penalty
up to three times the actual damages plus attorneys’ fees. By ad-
dressing future performance and the responsibility of the warran-
tor in case of unforeseen failure, the rights and remedies under the
Song-Beverly Act went far beyond the California Commercial
Code. In particular, the Commercial Code severely limits damages
to the cost of repair or diminution in value, provides no potential
for civil penalties or attorneys’ fees, and focuses on manufacturer
obligations regarding the product at the time of sale.
Not surprisingly, the original Song-Beverly Act had strong
public support among California residents. Private businesses,
however, opposed the bill, claiming the law was ‘‘poorly drafted,’’
‘‘full of ambiguities making the measure difficult to interpret,’’ ‘‘an
unnecessary restriction on big business,’’ and ‘‘absurd and ridic-
ulous’’ (Legislative enrolled bill report to Governor Reagan, 11
Sept. 1970; Legislative Commerce and Public Utilities Committee
analysis, 3 Aug. 1970; Lee Stoddard, Speed Queen letter, 12 Feb.
1971; Raypack Inc. letter to Governor Reagan, 12 Aug. 1970; Song
letters, 3 and 10 Aug. 1970). Manufacturers indicated that the
availability of civil penalties would clog the court system and put
them out of business. However, once it became clear the Act was
likely to pass despite contentious opposition, those opposing the
bill participated in the process. Senator Song’s description of his
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interactions with manufacturers highlights the process whereby
business values were injected into the revision process:
Once they realized that I was determined to pass SB 272, they sat
down quietly with me and we went over the bill section by section,
word by word. They admitted the need to end warranty abuses,
and I accepted a series of amendments that, without weakening
the bill, brought it more in line with current business practices.
(Song senatorial report 1990, pp. 1–4; see also Song letter to
Governor Reagan, 24 Aug. 1970)
The legislative history did not indicate precisely what changes or
revisions manufacturers requested in order to fall more in line with
current business practices. The final bill codified into law, however,
reduced recovery for civil penalties from three times actual dam-
ages to two. It also indicated that manufacturers and retailers
would only be liable under the Act if they had been given a ‘‘rea-
sonable number of attempts’’ to fix defects (Civil Code § 1793.2).
This provision, however, was not specifically defined in the Act.
Although the California Manufacturers and Retailers Associations
maintained that the bill was still ambiguous and poorly drafted,
they withdrew opposition to the bill. Most other businesses re-
mained opposed despite participating in the process. In August
1970, the Song-Beverly Act easily passed and went into effect for
products bought on or after March 1, 1971.
Senator Song’s achievement was a remarkable one because the
Song-Beverly Act was the first consumer warranty lawFstate or
federalFpassed in the country. At its inception, the Song-Beverly
Act’s purpose was to arm consumers with powerful legal weapons
attainable through the court system. However, all involved realized
that ambiguities in the law could create unforeseen challenges.
Even Senator Song noted that ‘‘like most new pieces of legislation,
[the Act had] its share of loopholes and ambiguities’’ (Song letter, 5
Nov. 1971). In particular, the Act did not define what constituted a
reasonable number of attempts, willful violation, or a civil penalty.
One also sees, even before the law’s passage, early attempts by
manufacturers to mediate the law’s impact.
Stage 2: Manufacturers’ Mediation of California Consumer Rights
Through Institutional Venue Creation
Despite lofty goals, the Song-Beverly Act was not entirely
effective during the 1970s. Testimony at the California State As-
sembly Committee’s hearings in December 1979, revealed a high
level of consumer frustration with new cars and warranty perfor-
mance. Manufacturers rarely acknowledged that they were given a
reasonable number of attempts to fix a defect under warranty, es-
pecially since the Song-Beverly Act did not define the term. As a
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result, full restitution or replacement of new automobiles rarely
occurred (Department of Consumer Affairs enrolled bill report, 2
July 1982; Bill Lockyear memo, Assembly Committee on Labor,
Employment, and Consumer Affairs, 18 April 1980).
In 1980, California Assemblywoman Sally Tanner decided to
clarify and expand the Song-Beverly Act by proposing a specific
law, referred to as the California ‘‘Lemon Law,’’ which defined
what constituted a ‘‘reasonable number of attempts’’ for new motor
vehicles. Because automobiles were the primary source of com-
plaints from consumers and the second most expensive purchase
for consumers, Assemblywoman Tanner felt that it was necessary to
add some teeth to legal protections afforded consumers. The bill
proposed that a consumer could invoke a ‘‘legal presumption’’ that
the automobile manufacturer had been legally given a reasonable
of attempts to repair a nonconformity if (1) the same nonconfor-
mity had been subject to repairs by the manufacturer or its agents
four or more times, or (2) the new motor vehicle had been out of
service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of 20 days or
more.
Manufacturers strongly objected to the Lemon Law and lob-
bied against the proposal. They alerted Assemblywoman Tanner
and the rest of the legislature through letters and detailed mem-
oranda that, in response to the Song-Beverly Act’s passage in 1970,
automobile manufacturers had created internal dispute resolution
processes to resolve consumer disputes. In particular, the three
major American automobile manufacturers, Ford, General Motors,
and Chrysler, submitted reports detailing the goals and structure of
their programs to the legislature. With some variation, these dis-
pute resolution processes consisted of panels of three to five per-
sons, often including manufacturer and dealer representatives, a
mechanic, and a consumer advocate.
Diffusion of institutional venues among manufacturers and
dealers occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. More than 2,000 auto-
motive dealers across the United States jointly funded and con-
trolled a third-party dispute resolution process to resolve warranty
complaints. Manufacturers often used the Better Business Bureau
or other third-party organizational surrogates to administer these
programs.
Manufacturer advocacy to the California legislature was also
uniform. Led by Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, manufac-
turers without exception framed the purpose and benefits of their
dispute resolution processes in terms of legitimacy, efficiency, in-
formality, and customer satisfaction as opposed to consumer pro-
tection. Manufacturers collectively claimed that their institutional
venues were primarily created to benefit consumers and provided
less costly, more effective ways of resolving disputes. Despite not
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providing consumers with a right to oral presentation, Ford noted
the legitimacy such programs provided ‘‘as self-regulating mech-
anisms. . . . Their very existence means that our dealers and our
own personnel are perceived as taking the extra steps required to
resolve issues to the satisfaction of customers . . . .’’ (Ford Consumer
Appeals Board memo, p. 2; in legislative records from the early
1980s). Full restitution in these programs, however, remained rare.
In sum, as in the employment context (Edelman et al. 1993),
internal dispute resolution processes provided a means through
which manufacturers’ values and norms influenced the structure
and content of the organizational field far more than did consum-
ers’ interests.11 Moreover, as shown in the interest group and
venue shopping literatures (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Pralle
2003, 2006), advocacy coalitions influenced public policy and re-
defined consumer rights by linking them to other socially recog-
nized values such as informality and efficiency.
Stage 3: The Legislature Codifies Manufacturer Institutional Venues
into the Lemon Law
After the original Lemon Law was narrowly defeated in 1980
and 1981, the Lemon Law, Civil Code § 1793.22, was enacted in
1982, but with significant changes from the original proposal.12 In
order to pass the bill, the California Legislature deferred to and
codified the logic of manufacturers’ valuation of institutional ven-
ues without any apparent formal review of these programs. Under
the Lemon Law, a consumer was entitled to a ‘‘legal presumption’’
11 In addition, a pure rational choice account of manufacturers’ response is unlikely
to fully explain manufacturers’ actions. The field of manufacturers and dealers developed
institutional venues in the 1970s even though manufacturers were not excessively at risk of
repurchasing cars. Between 1970 and 1980, the legislative history indicates that manu-
facturers rarely repurchased consumers’ automobiles because they claimed they had not
been given a reasonable number of attempts, and this provision was not defined in the
Song-Beverly Act. However, manufacturers created these structures anyway because they
were concerned about other business values such as exuding legitimacy, being responsive
to consumers, and creating informal forums to resolve problems (compare Edelman et al.
1992).
12 In 1981, Assemblywoman Tanner withdrew her proposed bill after the Senatorial
Subcommittee approved a proposal by Automobile Importers of America to tie the Lemon
Law to manufacturers’ dispute resolution programs. She withdrew the bill because she did
not want to require customers to take their grievance to company-sponsored panels, es-
pecially since some consumer groups were dissatisfied with these programs. Although with
reservations, Assemblywoman Tanner ultimately went along with the rest of the California
legislature and passed the Lemon Law in 1982. This is consistent with political science
studies that interest groups lobbying the legislature often engage in a contested struggle to
influence the legislature (Baumgartner & Jones 1993). Although this case study demon-
strates that what constitutes compliance with consumer protection law was institutionally
derived, lobbying and overt political conflict played a critical role as well. Therefore, in-
tegrating political science and sociology theories into an institutional-political framework in
this instance allows for a more complete explanation.
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that the manufacturer received a ‘‘reasonable number of attempts’’
if (1) the same nonconformity had been subject to repair four or
more times within the first 12,000 miles or 12 months from pur-
chase, or (2) had been out of service by reason of repair for a
cumulative total of more than 30 (not 20) calendar days within the
first 12,000 miles or 12 months from purchase. A manufacturer
was permitted to rebut the presumption at trial by showing that its
actions in a particular case was reasonable.
The most significant changes, however, concerned the codifi-
cation of manufacturers’ dispute resolution processes into the
Lemon Law. Specifically, the legal presumption as to what consti-
tuted a ‘‘reasonable number of attempts’’Fthe main purpose of
the Lemon LawFcould not be asserted in court unless the con-
sumer first resorted to the existing ‘‘qualified third-party dispute
resolution process’’ to the extent that a manufacturer maintained
one (Civil Code § 1793.22(c)). Thus, legal protections afforded
under the Lemon Law were contingent upon using manufacturers’
third-party dispute resolution processes if they existed. Dispute
resolution processes ‘‘qualified’’ if they met the minimum require-
ments set forth in the federal warranty law, the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty and Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Mag-
nuson-Moss Act), and in particular, Federal Trade Commission
Rule 703, for dispute resolution proceedings.13 Decisions under
dispute resolution processes were binding on manufacturers but
not consumers. Moreover, in a display of deference to manufac-
turer venues, the Lemon Law indicated that if the consumer chose
to reject the arbitrator’s ruling and sue, the arbitrator’s findings
could be admitted at trial without any need for evidentiary foun-
dation. The Lemon Law also provided that no civil penalties or
attorneys’ fees could be recovered in dispute resolution processes
unless the manufacturer-run program permitted such recovery.
Further, unlike the all (restitution, replacement) or nothing (no
award) remedies at trial, arbitrators were permitted to award con-
sumers the opportunity to allow manufacturers another repair at-
tempt.
Although manufacturers still publicly opposed passage of the
Lemon Law, some recognized the potential for keeping these dis-
putes out of courts. Loren Smith, a lobbyist for the Motor Car
13 In 1975, Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Act, which set forth minimum re-
quirements for manufacturers that chose to issue full warranties. Specifically, the Federal
Trade Commission regulation Rule 703 (1975) required manufacturers to (1) notify the
buyer about the existence, location, and method for using the dispute resolution program;
(2) fund the program; (3) insulate the program from manufacturer influence; (4) make the
program free to the consumer; and (5) require the program to reach a decision within 40
days. The Magnuson-Moss Act did not establish a means of ensuring that these programs
operated fairly and impartially. It also did not provide for civil penalties.
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Dealers Association, commented after the Lemon Law passed:
‘‘[w]e think it’s a good start. I look at it as a way to eliminate
court cases’’ (The Californian, 26 May 1982, p. 19) (compare
Edelman et al. 1993). Thus the broad, vague mandate of these laws
and weak enforcement mechanisms gave wide latitude to manu-
facturers.
Like employers in the civil rights context, manufacturers
responded to both environmental demands (change in public
attitudes and awareness, the law, legal mandates) and managerial
self-interests (desire for fewer lawsuits, greater efficiency, infor-
mality, quick resolution, and no civil penalties or attorney’s fees) by
developing private institutional venues to satisfy legitimacy and
efficiency concerns. Through issue redefinition, framing, and ad-
vocacy coalitions, organizations redefined and ‘‘converted’’ (com-
pare Hacker 2002, 2004; Barnes 2007, 2008) public rights
attainable in court into private rights to dispute resolution. The
legislature, without ever formally and critically analyzing whether
manufacturer institutional venues were procedurally and substan-
tively fair to consumers, ‘‘layered’’ manufacturer venues into the
Lemon Law via formal revisions (Streeck & Thelan 2004; Barnes
2007, 2008). Thus, the norms regarding compliance that evolved
within the organizational field during the 1970s shaped manufac-
turers’ conceptions of law in their lobbying behavior in the 1980s.
Stage 4: Conflicting Tensions of Symbolic Structures and Substantive
Compliance
Although the final codified Lemon Law encouraged consumers
to use automobile manufacturer–sponsored institutional venues,
the Lemon Law did not establish a means of ensuring that man-
ufacturer-run programs operate fairly. Consumers were funneled
into these processes by manufacturers claiming they were comply-
ing with the minimum requirements under FTC Rule 703. How-
ever, there was no regulatory or monitoring oversight. Not a single
manufacturer formally qualified its program under the Lemon
Law after its passage in 1982.
The legislative history indicates that many consumer groups
complained to Assemblywoman Tanner and the California Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs in the mid-1980s. Complaints included
allegations that (1) arbitrators often had no legal training and no
training in the Lemon Law, and often were not even provided
copies of the applicable warranty law, (2) many manufacturer pro-
cesses did not allow consumers oral presentation at hearings while
dealers and manufacturer representatives often participated in the
decisionmaking process (Ford and Chrysler) or staffed these panels
with their own employees, (3) manufacturer proceedings were
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taking much longer than 40 days as required by FTC guidelines,
and (4) arbitrators relied on expert testimony from mechanics
supplied by manufacturers to evaluate automotive defects. More-
over, decisions in favor of consumers often resulted merely in an-
other repair attempt for manufacturers. However, there was often
no follow-up by arbitrators to determine if repair attempts resolved
the problems.
Consumers virtually gave up on manufacturers’ dispute reso-
lution processes due to the lack of fairness, loss of time, and safety
hazards associated with continuing to drive unsafe vehicles. In a
letter to Assemblywoman Tanner, the Director of Consumer’s Aid
of Shasta, Inc., stated:
[s]ince I contacted you a year and half agoFI’ve given up com-
pletely on arbitration either BBB or the Mfgrs. [sic] I’ve been
referring all the people who contact meFafter they establish
their complaints with the manufacturer to go directly to a lawyer.
Boy this hurts, I believe only as a last resort in lawyers! I guess
I’m saying the only way the American made cars, which approx-
imately 85% of our calls have been American made, will listen and
improve their crappy quality control is through their pocket-
books! (Jean Clemens letter, 29 July 1987)
In 1987, Assemblywoman Tanner developed what she termed a
‘‘due process’’ bill. She proposed (1) establishing a program in the
California Bureau of Automotive Repair to certify manufacturer
arbitration programs, and (2) investigating consumer complaints
regarding the qualified program’s failure to follow its own written
procedures. Although certification was voluntary, Assemblywoman
Tanner proposed that if a manufacturer did not have a ‘‘qualified
third-party dispute resolution process’’ certified by the state and
the consumer filed suit and prevailed (i.e., was awarded restitution
or replacement), the consumer would be automatically entitled to a
civil penalty plus attorneys’ fees. No showing of willfulness was
required for the civil penalty.
Manufacturers, not surprisingly, were not pleased. Once again,
manufacturers deflected the Song-Beverly Act and Lemon Law’s
goal of protecting legal rights toward focusing their institutional
venues more on fairness and informality (compare Edelman et al.
1993). Automobile manufacturers argued that the certification
process would overly formalize the process. The following letter
sent by General Motors to the California legislature captures the
flavor of letters and memoranda sent by the vast majority of man-
ufacturers concerning their collective desire to not formalize pri-
vate dispute resolution processes:
AB 2057 would create a new certification process for automobile
manufacturers’ voluntary arbitration programs. In so doing, it
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would formalize the procedure to the point where an arbitrator would
be required to be trained in the specifics of the lemon law. . . . General
Motors has about 1,000 arbitrators in California. No more than 250
are attorneys. It seems unreasonable to provide for treble damages
based upon the decision of a layman arbitrator, untrained in
the law.
The idea of General Motors’ arbitration program, which is vol-
untary and predates the California’s [1982] lemon law, is that it be
informal and non-legal, that the process be easily understood by
the consumer, and that a lengthy court setting be avoided. (G.M.
letter, 8 July 1987; emphasis added)
Although this bill ultimately passed, it was not without significant
revisions. Labeled the ‘‘Tanner Compromise,’’ manufacturers
agreed to (1) certify their programs, (2) ‘‘take into account’’ stat-
utory standards, (3) provide dispute resolution panels with copies
of the Lemon Law, and (4) require panel familiarity with the law
(David Collins, General Motors, 16 Jan. 1990; see also Senate leg-
islative analysis, 4 Sept. 1987). However, arbitrators retained flex-
ibility and final authority regarding the standards, statutory or
otherwise, that they chose to ultimately apply in particular cases.
The finalized statutory language also indicated that manufacturers
could avoid non-willful civil penalties as long as they substantially
complied with certification requirements. Finally, manufacturers
who chose not to maintain a dispute resolution process or certify
their process under Civil Code § 1793.22(c) were not subject to a
mandatory civil penalty if the consumer received full restitution or
replacement at trial. Rather, in those situations, the jury had dis-
cretion to award a civil penalty up to twice the actual damages.
Thus, due to the lack of enforcement and monitoring mech-
anisms in the Lemon Law concerning dispute resolution processes,
manufacturers initially ignored the minimum procedural require-
ments and FTC Rule 703 guidelines. In response to consumer
outrage from 1982 to 1987, the legislature in 1987 focused its
efforts on regulating the certification process, but again left sub-
stantive results to manufacturers and their third-party administra-
tors. Since 1987, approximately three-fourths of all automobile and
motor home manufacturers participate in California’s Arbitration
Certification Program. Manufacturers that do not certify their
program often maintain some form of uncertified dispute resolu-
tion process.
Stage 5: Deference to Dispute Resolution ProceduresFLegislative Logic
Converges With Manufacturer Logic
Over time, amendments the legislature made to the Lemon
Law had less to do with protecting consumer rights and more to do
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with legitimating institutional venues into law and consequently,
bolstering the degree to which consumers, manufacturers, legisla-
tors, and courts deferred to institutional venues designed and
funded by manufacturers. Core legal ideals about impartiality and
protecting formal legal rights blurred with manufacturer logic re-
garding institutional venues framed as more efficient and informal.
In 1989, the Lemon Law was amended to clarify the dispute
resolution certification process. The amendment established that
when a Lemon Law case went to court, only decisions from a
qualified third-party dispute resolution process certified by the
state were admissible into evidence without further foundation.
This bill was unanimously adopted in response to a few rogue
manufacturers’ attempts to admit findings from uncertified dispute
resolution processes. The Senate Judiciary Committee expressly
noted the deference private venues should be afforded in court:
‘‘[t]his policy is intended to encourage manufacturers to submit
their dispute resolution programs for state certification by giving
extra credence to the findings and decisions of that body’’ (Legislative
Council report, 19 July 1989, p. 1; emphasis added).
In 1991, the legislature sponsored a bill that proposed pre-
cluding consumers from filing lawsuits unless they first participated
in the qualified third-party dispute resolution process and received
a decision. Thus, in this proposal, a consumer’s rightFnot just to
raise a legal presumption but also to file a lawsuit under the Song-
Beverly ActFwas predicated on participating in the manufactur-
ers’ dispute resolution process.
California’s leading plaintiffs’ Lemon Law firm, Kemnitzer,
Dickinson, Anderson & Barron (Kemnitzer), compiled information
from Better Business Bureau Autoline (a dispute resolution pro-
gram many manufacturers use to run their programs) and other
dispute resolution companies. Kemnitzer reported that consumer
awards under BBB Autoline are often far smaller than the full
restitution consumers can obtain in court. Of the 600 cases in which
consumers sought restitution from the manufacturer that the BBB
Autoline arbitrated in 1990, approximately 25 percent of consum-
ers received a restitutionary award that they could have received in
court while 57 percent were awarded the opportunity to allow
manufacturers another chance to fix the defectFa remedy not
available under the Song-Beverly Act or Lemon Law (Alan Cohen,
Senior Attorney, Council of BBB letter, 24 May 1991). Of the 250
cases in Northern California that were decided between 1988
and 1991 by Toyota’s and Hyundai’s dispute resolution pro-
grams, only 10 percent (25 cases) received full restitution (Mark
Anderson letter, 26 Aug. 1991, referencing deposition, 18 April
1991, Ricardy v. Toyota Motor Sales, Civil No. 46138 (Superior Court,
Sutter County)). Kemnitzer argued that, although private dispute
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resolution programs had improved, state certified third-party
venues sponsored by manufacturers should not be a prerequisite
to litigation.
The legislative history indicates that although the State Assem-
bly passed this proposal by a vote of 72-0, Assemblywoman Tanner
succeeded in having the proposal withdrawn by the State Senate on
the eve of the final vote after strong opposition from consumer
advocates. Nonetheless, the fact this proposal almost passed shows
how far the ‘‘rationalized myth’’ (Suchman & Edelman 1996) of
manufacturer institutional venues had been inscribed into legisla-
tive thinking regarding consumer rights.
Stage 6: Judicial DeferenceFOrganizational Logic Overlaps With
Judicial logic
Because many Lemon Law disputes have been privatized,
there are only four published California court cases substantively
interpreting manufacturer-sponsored dispute resolution processes.
However, the four cases exemplify the argument that consumer
warranty law is endogenous, i.e., much like legislative enactments,
judicial interpretations of consumer warranty violations incorpo-
rate the presence of institutionalized venues as evidence of fair
treatment, and a public policy concern for quick, informal resolu-
tion of consumer disputes. Judges, these cases suggest, reflexively
interpret consumer warranty protection law not as protecting legal
weapons, but as a system for keeping cases out of court in the hope
that consumers and manufacturers can work problems out in pri-
vate dispute resolution venues.
In 1994, the California court of appeals in the Second Appel-
late District issued two decisions within months clarifying that
manufacturers with qualified third-party dispute resolution pro-
cesses were immunized from non-willful civil penalties under Civil
Code § 1794(e) but potentially liable for civil penalties for willful
misconduct under Civil Code § 1794(c) (Suman v. BMW of North
America 1994). California courts indicated that the Legislature in-
tended to ‘‘confer a benefit’’ to manufacturers who maintained
dispute resolution processes by immunizing them from non-willful
civil penalties (Jernigan v. Ford Motor Co. 1994). California courts
also signaled that consumers should accept the success and failure
of such privatized processes: ‘‘[w]e encourage manufacturers to
maintain qualified third-party dispute resolution processes, there-
by ensuring that fewer consumers will have to take their problems
to court’’ (Suman v. BMW of North America 1994:13). The following
passage best reflects how, with respect to dispute resolution pro-
ceedings, the California courts adopted the logic and preferences
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of the legislature, which masks the fact that the legislature adopted
the logic and preferences of manufacturers:
The overall thrust of subdivision (e) is the Legislature’s prefer-
ence for using alternative forms of dispute resolution when a new
motor vehicle buyer has repeated difficulties getting his or her
nonconforming vehicle repaired properly. The intent of the Leg-
islature vis-à-vis subdivision (e) is encouragement of both the new
motor vehicle manufacturer and the new motor vehicle buyer to
work out their problems without resort to court intervention. To that
end, subdivision (e) offers manufacturers an incentive (‘carrot’)
for (1) maintaining a dispute resolution process and/or (2)
responding promptly to a consumer’s demand for replace-
ment or restitution . . . [§ 1794(e) is] a means of encouraging
consumers to communicate their troubles to the manufacturer prior
to filing a lawsuit . . . Subdivision (e) seeks to ensure that courts
of law are used as a last resort by consumers of new motor vehicles.
(Suman v. Sup. Ct. [BMW of North America] 1995:1318;
emphasis added)
The judicial and legislative message to consumers was clear: if a
dispute resolution process existed, then a consumer should use the
private ‘‘courthouse’’ (Edelman & Suchman 1999).
Even for willful civil penalties, dispute resolution procedures
constituted a partial defense. When evaluating willful misconduct
under § 1794(c), California courts held that juries should consider
the nature of the manufacturer’s conduct, including whether they
acted reasonably, acted in ‘‘good faith,’’ or maintained written pol-
icies and procedures to resolve consumer disputes (Kwan v. Mer-
cedes-Benz of North America 1994:186; Suman v. Sup. Ct. [BMW of
North America] 1995:1323). Thus, the judicial component of this
journey through California’s Lemon Law reflects deference to pri-
vate venues in a manner consistent with the legislature’s codifica-
tion of manufacturers’ preference for informal, private resolution
of public rights.
Stage 7: The Current State of Lemon Law Dispute Resolution
Since 1992, there has been very little substantive change to the
dispute resolution provisions of the California Lemon Law. Today,
all 50 states have consumer warranty laws. Many states channel
consumers into dispute resolution provisions as a prerequisite to
claiming a legal presumption in court. Over the course of 35 years
since California’s groundbreaking consumer warranty law, manu-
facturers have been able to develop and legitimate an alternative
dispute resolution system, with the blessing of the state, which
largely transforms and privatizes legal rights to a point where
manufacturers are, in effect, the legislature and court (Edelman &
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Suchman 1999). This is a critical yet largely unrecognized mech-
anism through which ‘‘the ‘haves’ come out ahead’’ (Galanter
1974:95).
Overlapping Organizational and Legal Fields and the
Privatization of Consumer Rights
This article elaborates the literature on organizational re-
sponses to law by combining political science theories of the leg-
islative process with neo-institutional studies of how organizations
shape the meaning of law. By integrating these approaches, my
‘‘institutional-political’’ framework explains not just how organiza-
tions shaped the content and meaning of law, but also how public
rights created by the legislature were channeled into private fo-
rums. Organizational construction of law in the legislative context
results from both institutional legal meaning-making in the orga-
nizational field and direct political mobilization and lobbying.
Private institutional venues created within manufacturers’ organi-
zational field shaped the meaning of law among public legal insti-
tutions such as legislatures and courts. As organizational and legal
fields and logics overlapped and blurred, institutionalized organi-
zational ideas and norms about the meaning of consumer rights
and what constitutes compliance with consumer protection laws
seeped into the logic of the legal field.
California’s consumer protection laws were intended to limit
manufacturers’ ability to perpetuate social and economic advan-
tage through the manufacturer-consumer relationship. Although
the Song-Beverly Act (1970) and the Lemon Law (1982) altered the
legal environment by changing public perceptions and attitudes
about consumer entitlement and rights, the ambiguity of these laws
gave manufacturers wide latitude to construct their legal environ-
ment. Manufacturers created internal dispute resolution proce-
dures as evidence of fair treatment and formed advocacy coalitions
that lobbied the legislature about the ‘‘legal value’’ (Edelman
et al. 1999:447) of the procedures. Manufacturers, similar to
employers, responded in a manner that addressed both environ-
mental demands (public perception, reputation, legitimacy) and
organizational business interests (efficiency, fewer lawsuits, infor-
mal resolution). As manufacturer dispute resolution venues
spread among manufacturers over time, the venues became insti-
tutionalized by organizations and legitimated by legislative codifi-
cation.
The legislative process became an important domain for im-
porting ideas from the organizational field into the legal field.
Amendments to the Lemon Law were less about preserving con-
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sumer rights and more about developing ways to legitimate these
organizational structures without extensive review and oversight.
Courts followed the legislature’s lead by indicating that the pur-
pose of the Lemon Law was to assist parties in resolving disputes
informally. Thus, courts were relevant only as a last resort even
though the Song-Beverly Act’s and the Lemon Law’s original pur-
pose was to arm consumers with legal weapons attainable in court.
The legislature’s and courts’ perceptions of manufacturer institu-
tional venues as efficient and the proper forum for these conflicts
was culturally conditioned around manufacturers’ norms and be-
liefs that private dispute resolution was the appropriate mechanism
for conflict resolution. Manufacturers constructed the meaning of
laws designed to regulate them and transformed laws intended to
provide consumers powerful rights into a codification of industry
practices. When the legislature and courts incorporated institu-
tionalized ideas from the organizational field into statutes and case
decisions, California consumer warranty laws became endogenous.
My institutional-political framework makes multiple contribu-
tions to sociology and political science studies of law and organi-
zations. In particular, I extend theories of legal endogeneity into
the legislative (as opposed to judicial) facet of the legal environ-
ment. I also show that the politics of consumer protection policy
and what manufacturers lobby for are, at least partially, institu-
tionally determined and rooted within the logic of organizational
fields. In this instance, manufacturer institutional venues are, es-
pecially when deferred to by legislatures and courts, a form of
political power.
My approach, therefore, enhances existing political science lit-
eratures concerning business influence over the legislative process.
First, my focus on institutional venues augments the theoretical
implications of the literature on interest group venue shopping by
demonstrating what businesses do when shifting from one venue to
another is unlikely to be helpful. Businesses create their own venues
to resolve disputes. Second, although the neo-institutional account
has some kinship with the regulatory capture literature, here,
manufacturers did not capture existing regulatory institutions, as
in the traditional account (Shapiro 1988; Herring 1936; Hunting-
ton 1952; Bernstein 1955; Kolko 1965; Sabatier 1975; Gormley
1983). Instead, manufacturers reshaped formal legislative lan-
guage and created new institutional venues in lieu of using public
venues where success was less likely. Finally, I augment the growing
political science literature on institutional change and development
by demonstrating that the overlapping and blurring of organiza-
tional fields and logics act as subtle ‘‘mechanisms of change’’
(Barnes 2008:11). Tracing how consumer protection laws were re-
vised over time reveals that the anchor for institutional change
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among public legal institutions often lies embedded inside business
organizations.
The Effects of Organizational Privatization of Public Legal Rights
Manufacturers, like employers, do not simply resist, ignore, or
obey ambiguous laws, but instead they construct compliance in a
manner that serves their rational and legitimacy interests. Legis-
lative and judicial deference to organizational responses to law had
a powerful effect on the meaning of consumer rights. In particular,
public legal rights created by the legislature were redefined and
controlled by private organizations.
Consumer rights have been redefined in powerful ways. First,
if a manufacturer maintains a dispute resolution process, the con-
sumer must use the process in order to claim the ‘‘legal presump-
tion’’ in court that a manufacturer has been given a ‘‘reasonable
number of attempts.’’ Second, simply by establishing a dispute
resolution procedure, manufacturers create the potential for re-
solving disputes without providing full restitution or replacement
(the only awards consumers are entitled to in court), paying plain-
tiffs’ attorneys’ fees (which consumers are automatically entitled to
in court should they prevail), and paying civil penalties up to twice
the actual damages. Instead, one final repair attempt can be
‘‘awarded’’ in favor of consumers. Third, if the manufacturer pre-
vails in the private process, the manufacturer now contains a legal
weapon, namely, the arbitrator’s findings, which are admissible in
court without evidentiary foundation should the consumer decide
to sue. The fate of California’s consumer protection laws as mech-
anisms for social change poignantly demonstrates the paradoxical
role that law plays in American society. The legislature initially
provided consumers with weapons but then limited the practical
effect of these weapons when it made them contingent on the use
of manufacturer dispute resolution processes.
Manufacturers were also able to control consumer rights once
they were privatized. As managerial and business values penetrated
the way legislators and courts understood consumer protection law,
manufacturers gained the ability to control the processes, the
rights, and the remedies through private dispute resolution ven-
ues. In particular, manufacturers co-opted the dispute resolution
process because they fund the processes, design the rules and
remedies, and are the ‘‘repeat players’’ who benefit from altered
rules (Galanter 1974:97). Other than attempts by legislators to le-
gitimate these structures by establishing parameters for certifica-
tion and cursory state regulatory monitoring mechanisms,
manufacturers have in effect deregulated themselves from court
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jurisdiction and implemented their altered version of consumer
rights in private venues.14
It is important to note that manufacturers’ eagerness to
privatize the process is not likely driven by wanton disregard for
the law or lack of concern over consumer warranty problems. The
legislative history suggests that manufacturers believe that these
processes are better for the consumer because they are more
informal and efficient. Manufacturers also believe that these
processes free the court system of these cases. However, manufac-
turers’ ability to control consumer warranty rights through private
dispute resolution procedures transforms and potentially under-
mines formal legal rights in several ways.
First, the punitive, compensatory, and deterrence goals of con-
sumer protection laws may remain unfulfilled by these procedures.
Manufacturers frame a new rights rhetoric geared more around
therapeutic healing (letting the consumer air frustrations) and
problem-solving (giving the manufacturer one final repair attempt)
than substantive relief obtainable in the court system (restitution,
replacement, attorneys’ fees, and civil penalties). At one point,
General Motors admitted that only 250 of its 1,000 arbitrators were
lawyers and purposely instructed its arbitrators not to rely on law
when addressing disputes (G.M. letter, 8 July 1987). Second, an
unfair dispute resolution process together with an unfavorable
ruling may convince some consumers that further legal action is
unwarranted or futile. The most significant way that manufacturer
control transforms legal rights is that legislatures and courts view
these institutional venues themselves as evidence of good faith on
the part of the manufacturer when evaluating whether a manu-
facturer’s failure to repurchase was willful.
Social Policy Implications
When evaluated from a social policy standpoint, manufactur-
ers’ adoption of institutional venues to resolve disputes has not
been entirely negative for consumers. At a minimum, institutional
venues are symbols that demonstrate commitment to consumer
warranty protection. Institutional venues may also provide a sig-
nificant opportunity for consumers to vent frustrations, resolve
disputes, and even punish manufacturers in the form of restitution
when consumers are fed up with improper service and a breach of
warranty is recognized by the arbitrator. However, the implemen-
tation of symbolic policies and procedures does not guarantee
substantive change for consumers. Even in the most favorable in-
14 Of course, as one anonymous reviewer noted, not all claims by consumers, whether
in court or private venues, are necessarily meritorious.
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stitutional venues, these procedures do not provide equivalent
compensation or public recognition that consumers could receive
through Lemon Law claims in court. Manufacturers’ adoption of
dispute resolution procedures may perhaps represent an improve-
ment in handling consumer warranty disputes, but it may also
hinder detection of manufacturers not living up to their obligations
under warranties.
Even in situations where one would most expect law to protect
the one-shot playerFcases arising under a remedial statute grant-
ing individual rightsFthere are subtle, nuanced ways by which
statutes can be weakened. Once legislatures and courts codify and
defer to institutional venues, one sees a shift toward more orga-
nizational power both to resists rights mandates and to control the
enforcement, the dispute resolution process, rules, and most im-
portant, the meaning of consumer rights. Although Minnesota At-
torney General Hubert H. Humphrey in 1989 submitted a letter
on behalf of attorney generals in all 50 states proclaiming, ‘‘[s]tate
new car lemon laws [are] the single most important advance in
consumer protection in the last decade’’ (CA Lemon Law report
2002), the law in action suggests that these laws are susceptible to
organizational transformation and reconstruction in subtle but
powerful ways.
Although this article focuses on deference to organizational
dispute resolution venues in the context of consumer warranty
laws, scholars would be well served to examine legislative and reg-
ulatory deference and codification of structures that organizations
create in other areas affecting consumers: namely, financial and
capital markets governanceFespecially in light of the current eco-
nomic crisis in the United States. Amidst the push toward collab-
orative and delegated governance arrangements between business
and government in the past two decades, laws such as the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act15 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act16 rely on and defer
to corporations’ financial disclosure policies and internal compli-
ance structures such as ethics codes, monitoring, and auditing and
reporting systems in order to protect consumers and investors
from financial fraud (Krawiec 2003; O’Brien 2007). Similar to the
Lemon Law context, the legislative and regulatory apparatus looks
to corporations to determine what ‘‘best practices’’ are and what
constitutes compliance with these laws. Although these corporate
structures may symbolize compliance and ethical conduct by cor-
porations, the recent financial crisis shows that such institutional-
ized structures may provide little guarantee that financial fraud
and abuse will not occur.
15 Pub. L No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
16 Pub. L No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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How the basic architecture of legal systemsFpublic and private
Fare institutionally structured in ways to privatize law and limit
possibilities of using the public system for redistributing change is
worthy of future focus by political and sociolegal scholars. Given
the current momentum for public-private governing models and
the prevalence of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer and employment contracts, the subtle struggles for legal
institutional power and authority in the twenty-first century are not
likely only about what the rules are, i.e., playing for favorable rules
in the disputing game, but rather, who is the legitimate supplier of
the rules and where the legitimate venue is for the disputing game.
References
Abel, Richard (1982) The Politics of Informal Justice. New York: Academic Press.
Albiston, Catherine (1999) ‘‘The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of
Losing by Winning,’’ 33 Law & Society Rev. 869–910.
FFF (2005) ‘‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Social Institutions: Competing Dis-
courses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights,’’ 39 Law &
Society Rev. 11–50.
Andreason, Alan R., & Arthur Best (1977) ‘‘Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Pur-
chases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Re-
dress,’’ 11 Law & Society Rev. 701–42.
Ayres, Ian, & John Braithwaite (1991) ‘‘Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empow-
erment,’’ 16 Law & Social Inquiry 435–96.
FFF (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. New York: Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
Bardach, Eugene, & Robert A. Kagan (1982) Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory
Unreasonableness. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press.
Barnes, Jeb (2007) ‘‘Rethinking the Landscape of Tort Reform: Legislative Inertia and
Court-Based Tort Reform in the Case of Asbestos,’’ 28 Justice Systems J. 157–81.
FFF (2008) ‘‘Courts and the Puzzle of Institutional Stability and ChangeFAdmin-
istrative Drift and Judicial Innovation in the Case of Asbestos,’’ 61 Political Research
Q. 636–48.
Barnes, Jeb, & Tom Burke (2006) ‘‘The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to
Organizational Rights Practices,’’ 40 Law & Society Rev. 493–534.
Baumgartner, Frank R., & Bryan D. Jones (1993) Agendas and Instability in American
Politics. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Bennett, Andrew, & Colin Elman (2006) ‘‘Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in
Case Study Methods,’’ 9 Annual Rev. Political Science 455–76.
Bernstein, Marver H. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press.
Best, Arthur, & Bernard Brown (1977) ‘‘Governmental Facilitation of Consumerism: A
Proposal for Consumer Action Groups,’’ 50 Temple Law Q. 253–319.
Brady, Henry, & David Collier, eds. (2004) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared
Standards. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Crenshaw, Kimberle W. (1988) ‘‘Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation &
Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law,’’ 101 Harvard Law Rev. 1331–87.
556 The Privatization of Public Legal Rights
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
Delgado, Richard (1988) ‘‘ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Defor-
malization Movement,’’ 13 Law & Social Inquiry 145–54.
Delgado, Richard, et al. (1985) ‘‘Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prej-
udice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,’’ 1985 Wisconsin Law Rev. 1359–1404.
DiMaggio, Paul J., & Walter W. Powell (1983) ‘‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,’’ 48 American So-
ciological Rev. 147–60.
Dobbin, Frank, & John Sutton (1998) ‘‘The Strength of a Weak State: The Employment
Rights Revolution and the Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions,’’ 104
American J. of Sociology 441–76.
Dobbin, Frank, et al. (1993) ‘‘Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Construc-
tion of Internal Labor Markets,’’ 99 American J. of Sociology 396–427.
Edelman, Lauren B. (1990) ‘‘Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace,’’ 95 American J. of Sociology
1401–40.
FFF (1992) ‘‘Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of
Civil Rights Law,’’ 97 American J. of Sociology 1531–76.
FFF (2002) ‘‘Legality and the Endogeneity of Law,’’ in R. Kagan et al., eds., Legality
and Community. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
FFF (2005) ‘‘The Endogeneity of Law: Civil Rights at Work,’’ in R. Nelson & L.
Nielson, eds., Handbook on Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities.
Kluwer Academic Press.
FFF (2007) ‘‘Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of
Law,’’ in Justin O’Brien, ed., Private Equity, Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of
Capital Market Regulation. London: Imperial College Press.
Edelman, Lauren B., & Robin Stryker (2005) ‘‘A Sociological Approach to Law and the
Economy,’’ in N. Smelser & R. Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Edelman, Lauren B., & Mark C. Suchman (1999) ‘‘When the ‘Haves’ Hold Court:
Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law,’’ 33 Law & Society Rev.
941–92.
FFF (2007) ‘‘Introduction: The Interplay of Law and Organizations,’’ in L. Edelman
& M. Suchman, eds., The Legal Lives of Private Organizations. Dartmouth, UK: Ash-
gate Publishing.
Edelman, Lauren B., et al. (1992) ‘‘Professional Construction of the Legal Environ-
ment: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge Doctrine,’’ 26 Law & Society Rev.
47–83.
Edelman, Lauren B., et al. (1993) ‘‘‘Employers’ Handling of Discrimination Complaints:
The Transformation of Rights in the Workplace,’’ 27 Law & Society Rev. 497–534.
Edelman, Lauren B., et al. (1999) ‘‘The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures as Rational Myth,’’ 105 American J. of Sociology 406–54.
Edelman, Lauren B., et al. (2001) ‘‘Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of
Law,’’ 106 American J. of Sociology 1589–641.
Erlanger, Howard S., et al. (1987) ‘‘Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context,’’ 21 Law & Society Rev. 585–
604.
Ewick, Patricia, & Susan S. Silbey (1998) The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday
Life. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Freeman, Jody (2000) ‘‘The Private Role in Public Governance,’’ 75 New York Univ. Law
Rev. 543–675.
Galanter, Marc (1974) ‘‘Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change,’’ 9 Law & Society Rev. 95–160.
Galanter, Marc, & John Lande (1992) ‘‘Private Courts and Public Authority,’’ 12 Studies
in Law, Politics, & Society 393–415.
Talesh 557
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
George, Alexander, & Andrew Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gormley, William (1983) The Politics of Public Utility Regulation. Pittsburgh: Univ. of
Pittsburgh Press.
Hacker, Jacob (2002) The Divided Welfare State: The Battle of Public and Private Social
Benefits in the United States. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
FFF (2004) ‘‘Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden
Politics of Social Retrenchment in the United States,’’ 98 American Political Science
Rev. 243–60.
Hacker, Jacob, & Paul Pierson (2002) ‘‘Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and
the Formation of the American Welfare State,’’ 30 Politics & Society 277–325.
Harrington, Christine B. (1985) Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutionalization of
Alternatives to Court. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
Hawkins, Keith (1983) ‘‘Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the
Enforcement of Regulation,’’ 5 Law & Policy Q. 35–73.
Heimer, Carol (1999) ‘‘Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in Neonatal
Intensive Care,’’ 33 Law & Society Rev. 17–66.
Herring, Pendleton (1936) Public Administration and the Public Interest. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1952) ‘‘The Marasmus of the ICC,’’ 61 Yale Law J. 467–509.
Kagan, Robert A., et al. (2003) ‘‘Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance:
How Does Regulation Matter?,’’ 37 Law & Society Rev. 51–90.
Kamieniecka, Sheldon (2006) Corporate America and Environmental Policy: How Does Busi-
ness Get Its Way? Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
Kingdon, John (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2d ed. New York: Harper
Collins.
Kolko, Gabriel (1965) Railroads and Regulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Krawiec, Kimberly (2003) ‘‘Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Gov-
ernance,’’ 81 Washington Univ. Law Rev. 487–523.
Leech, Beth L., et al. (2002) ‘‘Organized Interests and Issue Definition in Policy Debates,’’
in A. Cigler & B. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Lobel, Orly (2004) ‘‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Gover-
nance in Contemporary Legal Thought,’’ 89 Minnesota Law Rev. 342–470.
Macaulay, Stewart (1965) ‘‘Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Cor-
poration and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers,
and the Legal System, Law & Society,’’ 483 Wisconsin Law Rev. 3–212.
FFF (1979) ‘‘Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws,’’ 14 Law & Society Rev. 115–71.
FFF (1986) ‘‘Private Government,’’ in L. Lipson & S. Wheeler, eds., Law & the Social
Sciences. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
FFF (1991) ‘‘Long-Term Continuing Relations: The American Experience Regulating
Dealerships and Franchises,’’ in C. Joerges, ed., Franchising and the Law: Theoretical
and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States. Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellshaft.
Meyer, John W., & Brian Rowan (1977) ‘‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Struc-
ture as Myth and Ceremony,’’ 83 American J. of Sociology 340–63.
Minow, Martha (1987) ‘‘Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover,’’ 96 Yale Law
Rev. 1860–915.
O’Brien, Justin (2007) ‘‘The Dynamics of Capital Markets Governance,’’ in J. O’Brien,
ed., Private Equity, Corporate Governance & the Dynamics of Capital Market Regulation.
London: Imperial College Press.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, & Gerald R. Salancik (1978) The External Control of Organizations: A
Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Pierson, Paul (2000a) ‘‘The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and
Change,’’ 13 Governance 475–99.
558 The Privatization of Public Legal Rights
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
FFF (2000b) ‘‘Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics,’’ 94
American Political Science Rev. 251–67.
FFF (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press.
Posner, Richard A. (1974) ‘‘Theories of Economic Regulation,’’ 5 Bell J. of Economics and
Management Science 337–52.
Pralle, Sarah (2003) ‘‘Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The
Internationalization of Canadian Forestry Advocacy,’’ 23 J. of Public Policy
233–60.
FFF (2006) ‘‘The ‘Mouse that Roared’: Agenda Setting in Canadian Pesticides Pol-
itics,’’ 34 Policy Studies J. 171–94.
Quirk, Paul J. (1981) Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press.
Riker, William H. (1996) The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution.
New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Rosenberg, Gerald (1991) The Hollow Hope. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Sabatier, Paul A. (1975) ‘‘Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies,’’ 6 Policy Sciences
301–42.
Sabatier, Paul, & Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds. (1999) ‘‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework:
An Assessment,’’ in P. Sabatier, ed., Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Scheingold, Stuart A. (1974) The Politics of Rights. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Schickler, Eric (2001) Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the
United States Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Schneiberg, Marc (2005) ‘‘Combining New Institutionalisms: Explaining Institutional
Change in American Property Insurance,’’ 20 Sociological Forum 93–137.
Schneiberg, Marc, & Tim Bartley (2001) ‘‘Regulating American Industries: Markets,
Politics and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation,’’ 107
American J. of Sociology 101–46.
Scott, Richard W. (1983) ‘‘The Organization of Environments: Networks, Cultural &
Historical Elements,’’ in J. Meyer & R. Scott, eds., Organizational Environment: Ritual
& Rationality. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Scott, Richard W., & Gerald F. Davis (2007) Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Nat-
ural, and Open Systems Perspectives. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Shapiro, Martin (1988) Who Guards the Guardians? Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press.
Short, Jodi L. (2006) ‘‘Creating Peer Sexual Harassment: Mobilizing Schools to Throw
the Book at Themselves,’’ 28 Law & Policy 31–59.
Silbey, Susan, & Austin Sarat (1989) ‘‘Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship:
From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject,’’ 66
Denver Univ. Law Rev. 437–98.
Snow, David, et al. (1986) ‘‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Move-
ment Participation,’’ 51 American Sociological Rev. 464–81.
Stigler, George J. (1971) ‘‘The Theory of Economic Regulation,’’ 2 Bell J. of Economics
and Management Science 3–21.
Streeck, Wolfgang, & Kathleen Thelan (2004) ‘‘Introduction: Institutional Change in
Advanced Political Economies,’’ in W. Streeck & K. Thelan, eds., Beyond Continuity.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Suchman, Mark, & Lauren B. Edelman (1996) ‘‘Legal-Rational Myths: Lesson for the
New Institutionalism from the Law and Society Tradition,’’ 21 Law & Social Inquiry
903–41.
Sutton, John, et al. (1994) ‘‘The Legalization of the Workplace,’’ 99 American J. of So-
ciology 944–71.
Thelan, Kathleen (1999) ‘‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,’’ 2 Annual
Rev. Political Science 369–404.
Talesh 559
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
FFF (2004) How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the
United States and Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Trubek, David, & Thierry Bourgognie (1987) Consumer Law, Common Markets, & Fed-
eralism. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
Trubek, David, et al. (1979) ‘‘Market Discrimination and the Impact of Consumer Dis-
closure Laws: The Used Car Industry,’’ 13 Law & Society Rev. 695–720.
Tushnet, Mark V. (1984) ‘‘An Essay on Rights,’’ 62 Texas Law Rev. 1363–403.
Vaughn, Diane (1998) ‘‘Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of
Organizations,’’ 32 Law & Society Rev. 23–61.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Wilson, James Q. (1989) The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books.
Cases Cited
Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 23 Cal. App. 4th 174 (Cal. App. 1994).
Jernigan v. Ford Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th 488 (Cal. App. 1994).
Suman v. BMW of North America, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Cal. App. 1994).
Suman v. Sup. Ct. (BMW of North America), 39 Cal. App. 4th 1309 (Cal. App. 1995).
Statutes Cited
California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, § 1790 et seq. (1970).
California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, § 1793.2 (1970).
California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, §§ 1794(c) & (e) (1970).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq. Pub. L No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999).
Magnuson-Moss Warranty and Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
2301 et seq. Pub L. No. 93-637 (1975).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. 7201, Pub. L No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002).
Tanner Consumer Protection Act, § 1793.22 (1982).
Legislative History (from California State Archives)
California Statute 1970, chapter 1333, SB 272.
California Statute 1971, chapter 1523, SB 742.
California Statute 1972, chapter 1293, SB 685.
California Statute 1976, chapter 416, SB 568.
California Statute 1978, chapter 991, AB 3374.
California Statute 1980, chapter 394, AB 2263.
California Statute 1981, chapter 150, SB 282.
California Statute 1982, chapter 381, AB 3561.
California Statute 1982, chapter 388, AB 1787.
California Statute 1986, chapter 547, AB 3835.
California Statute 1986, chapter 547, AB 3835.
California Statute 1987, chapter 1280, AB 2057.
California Statute 1988, chapter 697, AB 4513.
California Statute 1989, chapter 193, AB 1104.
560 The Privatization of Public Legal Rights
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
California Statute 1991, chapter 689, AB 211.
California Statute 1992, chapter 1232, SB 1762.
California Statute 2002, chapter 306, SB 1765.
Regulation Cited
Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC Rule 703.
Shauhin Talesh is a doctoral candidate in the Jurisprudence & Social
Policy Program, Berkeley School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
He received his J.D. and LL.M. in insurance from the University of
Connecticut, and his B.A. in Criminology, Law & Society from the
University of California, Irvine. He is an interdisciplinary scholar whose
work spans law, sociology, and political science. His research interests
include the empirical study of law and business organizations, courts,
dispute resolution, consumer protection, insurance, the relationship between
law and social inequality, and the relationship between law and social
change.
Talesh 561
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
562 The Privatization of Public Legal Rights
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908987
